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Protokol Diffi Hellmana na eliptichnih krivih angl Elliptic curve Diffie Hellman ECDH kriptografichnij protokol sho dozvolyaye dvom storonam yaki mayut pari vidkritij zakritij klyuch na eliptichnih krivih otrimati zagalnij sekretnij klyuch vikoristovuyuchi nezahishenij vid prosluhovuvannya kanal zv yazku Cej sekretnij klyuch mozhe buti vikoristanij yak dlya shifruvannya podalshogo obminu tak i dlya formuvannya novogo klyucha yakij potim mozhe vikoristovuvatisya dlya podalshogo obminu informaciyeyu za dopomogoyu algoritmiv simetrichnogo shifruvannya Ce variaciya protokolu Diffi Gellmana z vikoristannyam eliptichnoyi kriptografiyi Opis algoritmuNehaj isnuyut dva abonenti Alisa i Bob Pripustimo Alisa hoche stvoriti spilnij sekretnij klyuch z Bobom ale yedinij dostupnij mizh nimi kanal mozhe pidsluhati tretya storona Spochatku povinen buti uzgodzhenij nabir parametriv p a b G n h displaystyle p a b G n h dlya zagalnogo vipadku i m f x a b G n h displaystyle m f x a b G n h dlya polya harakteristiki 2 displaystyle 2 Vidpovidno u kozhnoyi storoni povinna buti para klyuchiv sho skladayetsya z zakritogo klyucha d displaystyle d vipadkovo obranogo cile chislo z intervalu 1 n 1 displaystyle 1 n 1 i vidkritogo klyucha Q displaystyle Q de Q d G displaystyle Q d cdot G ce rezultat togo sho proroblyaye d displaystyle d raz operaciyi pidsumovuvannya elementa G displaystyle G Nehaj todi para klyuchiv Alisi bude d A Q A displaystyle d A Q A a para Boba d B Q B displaystyle d B Q B Pered vikonannyam protokolu storoni povinni obminyatisya vidkritimi klyuchami Alisa obchislyuye x k y k d A Q B displaystyle x k y k d A cdot Q B Bob obchislyuye x k y k d B Q A displaystyle x k y k d B cdot Q A Zagalnij sekret x k displaystyle x k x koordinata ciyeyi tochki Bilshist standartnih protokoliv sho bazuyutsya na ECDH vikoristovuyut funkciyi formuvannya klyucha dlya otrimannya simetrichnogo klyucha znachennya x k displaystyle x k Obchisleni znachennya uchasnikami rivni tak yak d A Q B d A d B G d B d A G d B Q A displaystyle d A cdot Q B d A cdot d B cdot G d B cdot d A cdot G d B cdot Q A Z usiyeyi informaciyi pov yazanoyi zi svoyim zakritim klyuchem povidomlyaye Alisa tilki svij vidkritij klyuch Takim chinom nihto krim Alisi ne mozhe viznachiti yiyi zakritij klyuch krim uchasnika zdatnogo virishiti zadachu diskretnogo logarifmuvannya na eliptichnij krivij Zakritij klyuch Boba analogichno zahishenij Nihto krim Alisi abo Boba ne mozhe obchisliti yih zagalnij sekret krim uchasnika zdatnogo rozv yazati problemu Diffi Gellmana Vidkriti klyuchi buvayut abo statichnimi i pidtverdzheni sertifikatom abo efemerni skorocheno ECDHE vikoristovuyutsya timchasovo j ne obov yazkovo autentifikuyut vidpravnika takim chinom yaksho potribna avtentifikaciya pidtverdzhennya avtentichnosti povinno buti otrimano inshim sposobom Avtentifikaciya neobhidna dlya viklyuchennya mozhlivosti ataki poserednika Yaksho Alisa abo Bob vikoristovuyut statichnij klyuch nebezpeka ataki poserednika viklyuchayetsya ale ne mozhe buti zabezpechena ni pryama sekretnist ni stijkist do pidmini pri komprometaciyi klyucha yak i deyaki inshi vlastivosti stijkosti do atak Koristuvachi statichnih zakritih klyuchiv zmusheni pereviryati chuzhij vidkritij klyuch i vikoristovuvati funkciyu formuvannya klyucha na zagalnij sekret shob zapobigti vitoku informaciyi pro statichno zakritij klyuch Dlya shifruvannya z inshimi vlastivostyami chasto vikoristovuyetsya protokol Pri vikoristanni zagalnogo sekretu yak klyucha chasto bazhano geshuvat sekret shob pozbutisya vid vrazlivostej sho vinikli pislya zastosuvannya protokolu PrikladEliptichna kriva E nad polem G F 2 163 displaystyle GF 2 163 maye poryadok 2 P 49 displaystyle 2 cdot P49 de P49 proste chislo skladayetsya z 49 cifr u desyatkovomu zapisi E Y 2 X Y X 3 X 2 1 displaystyle E quad Y 2 XY X 3 X 2 1 Viberemo Nezvidnij mnogochlen 1 X X 2 X 8 X 163 displaystyle 1 X X 2 X 8 X 163 I vizmemo tochku eliptichnoyi krivoyi P d 42149 e 09429 d f 4563 e c 1816488 c 92 d e 89 f 93 a 9 b 2 c c d 18 d 6 c c 3042 c 4 c 17 a 213506345 c 80965 a c 19476 0 displaystyle P d42149e09429df4563ec1816488c92de89f93a9b2 ccd18d6cc3042c4c17a213506345c80965ac19476 neq 0 Perevirimo sho yiyi poryadok ne dorivnyuye 2 2 P c c d 18 d 6 c c 3042 c 4 c 17 a 213506345 c 809 b 5 a c 1 d 476 835 a 2 f 56 b 88 d 6 a 249 b 4 b d 2 a 7550 a 4375 e 531 d 8 a 37 displaystyle 2P ccd18d6cc3042c4c17a213506345c809b5ac1d476 835a2f56b88d6a249b4bd2a7550a4375e531d8a37 Znachit yiyi poryadok dorivnyuye poryadku grupi 2 P 49 displaystyle 2 cdot P49 a same chislu P 49 displaystyle P49 i yiyi mozhna vikoristovuvati dlya pobudovi klyucha Nehaj k A 12 displaystyle k A 12 k b 123 displaystyle k b 123 Todi vidkriti klyuchi uchasnikiv protokolu obchislyuyutsya yak k A P 12 P b d 9776 b b e 87 a 8 b 1024 b e 2 e 415952 f 527 e e e 928 b 43 c 67 a 28 e d 7 b 137 e 756 c 37654 f 186 a 71 b f 64 e 5 a c 546 displaystyle k A cdot P 12 cdot P bd9776bbe87a8b1024be2e415952f527eee928b43 c67a28ed7b137e756c37654f186a71bf64e5ac546 k B P 123 P a 5684 e 246044 f c 126 e 9832 d 17513387 e 474290547 568 b 4137 f 09 f 5 f 79 a 8 a 6 b 0 f e 44 c d f 41 d 8 e 68 a e 2 c 6 displaystyle k B cdot P 123 cdot P a5684e246044fc126e9832d17513387e474290547 568b4137f09f5f79a8a6b0fe44cdf41d8e68ae2c6 A zagalnij sekret bude dorivnyuvati k B k A P k A k B P 12 123 P b b 7856 c e c e 13 c 71919534878 b c b 6 f 3 a 887 d 613 c 92 f 661 f f d f e 1 b a 8 c b 1 b 2 a d 17 b 6550 c 65 a a 6 d 4 f 07 f 41 displaystyle k B cdot k A cdot P k A cdot k B cdot P 12 cdot 123 cdot P bb7856cece13c71919534878bcb6f3a887d613c92 f661ffdfe1ba8cb1b2ad17b6550c65aa6d4f07f41 V yakosti klyucha simetrichnoyi sistemi vikoristovuyetsya znachennya abo jogo chastina x b b 7856 c e c e 13 c 71919534878 b c b 6 f 3 a 887 d 613 c 92 displaystyle x bb7856cece13c71919534878bcb6f3a887d613c92 Programne zabezpechennya en nabir parametriv eliptichnih i posilan realizovanij Danielem Bernstajnom na movi Si Div takozhEliptichna kriptografiya Protokol Diffi GellmanaPrimitkiAn Efficient Protocol for Authenticated Key Agreement 2003 s 119 Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography 2013 s 11 Suite B Implementer s Guide to NIST SP 800 56A 2009 s 8 SEC 1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 2009 s 63 Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography 2009 s 40 Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography 2009 s 20 SEC 1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 2009 s 30 Elementarnoe vvedenie v ellipticheskuyu kriptografiyu Protokoly kriptografii na ellipticheskih krivyh 2006 s 85 LiteraturaElaine Barker Lily Chen Allen Roginsky Miles Smid Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography angl http nvlpubs nist gov 10 bereznya 2018 u Wayback Machine National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013 ISBN 1495447502 Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group SECG SEC 1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography angl http www secg org 24 bereznya 2022 u Wayback Machine Certicom Corp 2009 P 15 28 56 58 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Suite B Implementer s Guide to NIST SP 800 56A angl https www nsa gov 9 grudnya 2020 u Wayback Machine 2009 Laurie Law An Efficient Protocol for Authenticated Key Agreement angl Laurie Law Alfred Menezes Minghua Qu et al Designs Codes and Cryptography Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003 Vol 28 no 2 P 119 134 ISSN 0925 1022 DOI 10 1023 A 1022595222606 Bolotov A A Gashkov S B Frolov A B Glava 2 Protokoly na ellipticheskih krivyh Elementarnoe vvedenie v ellipticheskuyu kriptografiyu Protokoly kriptografii na ellipticheskih krivyh M KomKniga 2006 S 83 86 ISBN 5 484 00444 6 BBK 32 81 UDK 512 8
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